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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Lee Hargrave*
POWER TO INITIATE PROSECUTIONS
Guidry v. Roberts' held unconstitutional a requirement of the
Louisiana campaign practices law that criminal prosecutions for violation
of the act be instituted by a district attorney "only on the basis of
information forwarded to him by a supervisory committee.'"2 The supreme
court thought the provision to be inconsistent with the requirement of
article V, section 26(B) that the district attorney "shall have charge of
every criminal prosecution by the state in his district . .. .
The decision may be correct because of the inartfully drawn statute;
however, the court's language goes further:
The power of the district attorney to initiate criminal prosecutions for
such offenses in his district (or not to) appears to be limited only by
the provision of Article 4, Section 8, that, for cause when judicially
authorized, the attorney general may institute, prosecute, or intervene
in a criminal action or proceeding. 3
The quoted statement of the district attorney's powers over institution of
prosecutiohs is not supported by the text or the background of section 26.
The section refers to "having charge" of prosecutions and does not
address itself to "initiation of prosecutions." The provisions that do
concern commencement of criminal actions indicate the district attorney
has no absolute right over whether to prosecute a case or not. Article V,
section 34 recognizes the existence of grand juries and article I, section 15
requires a grand jury indictment for prosecution of capital offenses and
crimes punishable by life imprisonment. The language of section 15 which
requires that prosecution of felonies be initiated by indictment or informa-
tion leaves open to the legislature the matter of deciding which of the two
devices might be required in instances where the constitution does not
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
2. LA. R.S. 18:1492(B)(1) (Supp. 1975). The committee is composed of the
secretary of the Senate, the clerk of the House, the legislative auditor and the
executive director of the legislative council.
3. 335 So. 2d at 446-47.
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require a grand jury indictment. It also allows commencement by a
citizen's affidavit in misdemeanor cases.
The provisions of section 26 were adopted as part of a debate over the
relationship between the attorney general and the district attorney.4
Concern was expressed over checks and balances between those two
officials, and little debate was devoted to legislative power over
commencement of a prosecution. It would be consistent with that legisla-
tive history to construe the section in light of its referee function and not as
a constraint on the legislature in deciding how prosecutions ought to be
begun.
The language of section 26 comes from article 61 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which states that "the district attorney has entire
charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in
his district" and from the language that he "is the representative of the
state before the grand jury and is its legal advisor. . .. " in article 64 of
the same Code. Conspicuously missing from the constitution's language,
however, is the phrase of article 61 that a district attorney "determines
whom, when, and how he shall prosecute."
OPINIONS
The supreme court has been deciding some cases within its appellate
jurisdiction without issuing the customary full-length opinion. Particularly
in routine criminal cases, the court is simply announcing its judgment by
per curiam statements indicating: "Affirmed." In State v. Hills,' Justice
Summers objected to such a procedure and argued that it was unconstitu-
tional. The procedure may be questioned in terms of policy, but it is not in
violation of the constitution. While the 1921 constitution did contain the
provision, "The judges of all courts shall refer to the law and adduce the
reasons on which every definitive judgment is founded," 6 the 1974
constitution deleted that provision and contains no such injunction. It
would be contrary to that clear change in text to infer from other provi-
sions a constitutional requirement that opinions be issued in every case.
JURY EXEMPTIONS
Under prior practice a large. number of legislative exemptions from
jury service produced a system in which those persons best able to serve as
4. See Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
37 LA. L. REV. 765, 831 (1977).
5. 337 So. 2d 512 (La. 1976). See footnote I of the dissenting opinion for a
listing of recent cases in which per curiam affirmances were used.
6. LA. CoNsT. of 1921, art. VII, § 1.
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jurors seldom did. To avoid the log-rolling effect of interest groups
obtaining exemptions through legislative acts, the constitution removed
the power to grant exemptions from the legislature and granted it to the
supreme court.' The court has adopted rules granting some exemptions,
but provided that the exemption must be claimed by the person entitled to
it.8 It would be a violation of that rule for jury commissioners to exclude
from the jury venire the names of persons they believed to be exempt; it is
necessary for those exempt persons to be notified of their selection and
then they must claim their exemption. In State v. Procell9 the court
recognized that a jury selected in violation of this rule cannot validly
convict a person, and reversed a conviction returned by such an improper-
ly selected jury.
ATTORNEY GENERAL AND DISTRICT ATORNEY
State v. Neyrey, 10 on rehearing, recognizes the validity of a criminal
prosecution instituted by the attorney general at the request of a district
attorney even though court approval of the attorney general's action was
not obtained. In Neyrey, because the prospective defendant had been a
former client of the district attorney, the district attorney requested in
writing that the attorney general handle the case, stating that "you are
hereby given full authority to make any and all decisions necessary and
proper in accordance with your oath." 1
The case is consistent with article IV, section 8 even though that
section appears to require court approval based on cause before the
attorney general can "institute, prosecute, or intervene in any criminal
action or proceeding." 2 Judicial intervention is designed to introduce an
umpire to settle disagreements between a district attorney and the attorney
general over the handling of a criminal matter. In the absence of a dispute,
the cumbersome court approval procedure is unnecessary. 13 The provision
was not designed "to hinder cooperative efforts between a district attorney
and our state's chief legal officer . ... "14 In such instances, it is
consistent with that purpose to include within the power "to advise and
7. LA. CONST. art. V, § 33: "The supreme court shall provide by rule for
exemption of jurors." See Hargrave, supra note 4, at 845.
8. LA. SUP. CT. R. XXV, § 3.
9. 332 So. 2d 814 (La. 1976).
10. 341 So. 2d 319 (La. 1976).
11. Id. at 327.
12. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
13. Hargrave, supra note 4, at 831.
14. 341 So. 2d at 324.
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assist"'" on written request the power to institute a prosecution and to try
the case.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: MANDATES, PREAMBLES AND
"As PROVIDED BY LAW"
An ideal constitution would contain only self-executing provisions
that are judicially enforceable and that have a clear effect without the
necessity for legislation to implement them. Real-life constitutions, how-
ever, are drafted by political persons working through a political process
that often demands provisions which sound impressive but which have
little effect. At times, the political process results in vague provisions that
put off to another day the decision about the exact contours of a rule
simply because the votes for the clear rule were not there. A large part of
constitutional construction is understanding the nature of non-self-execut-
ing provisions which result from this kind of process and construing them
in the sense in which they were adopted.
A high-sounding preamble, for example, is de rigeur in a constitu-
tion though delegates realize it has virtually no legal effect. 16 The Louisia-
na Constitution even goes so far as to have two preambles-Article VIII
on education has its own separate preamble redounding with the jargon of
"learning environments and experiences" and one's opportunity to "de-
velop to his full potential." 7
The Louisiana Constitution contains a number of mandates to the
legislature even though it was known bythe delegates that such provisions
are not self-enforcing and that no mechanism exists to force the legislature
to comply with a mandate. Often, such mandates resulted when propo-
nents of some policy were unable to garner the votes necessary to adopt an
enforceable rule; they compromised on a mandate which they saw as a
psychological aid for their position or which might be of political aid to
their view in the future. Such was the background of the provision, "The
legislature shall provide for a uniform system for securing and compensat-
ing qualified counsel for indigents."' 8 The provision has no practical
effect, as the supreme court has recognized, in terms of judicial enforce-
15. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
16. STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM
TRANSCRIrrs, Aug. 28, 1973, at 52 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]; Hargrave,
The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 2
(1974).
17. LA. CONST. art. VIII; see PROCEEDINGS, supra note 16, Nov. 9, at 18, 24,
36, 122.
18. LA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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ment without legislation. 9 Similarly, when the environmentalist forces
were unable to pass a strong, enforceable right to a healthy environment,
they compromised on a general statement of policy followed by a man-
date, "The legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy." 20 Until
the laws are adopted, the policy statement remains unimplementable
directly by the courts, and no mechanism exists to force the legislature to
adopt any particular laws on the subject.
Another common drafting technique used in the Louisiana Constitu-
tion was to qualify a rule or a prohibition with the phrase "as provided by
law." Often, the effect of such a provision is the same as if nothing about
the matter were contained in the constitution, for the legislature can do
anything not prohibited. (E.g., "per diem and expenses may be provided
by law." 2 ) However, the use of the "as provided by law" formula to
modify a provision can have different effects depending on the context
used, and such a rule can often be effective without implementing legisla-
tion, as the provision continuing in existence the justice of the peace
courts, "subject to change by law." 2 2 Similarly, the commissioner of
insurance is a constitutional officer who must be elected statewide, but he
has no constitutional powers; "the commissioner shall have powers and
perform duties authorized by this constitution or provided by law. "23
Consistent and correct application of such provisions hinges on strict
attention to the wording of such provisions, for the Committee on Style
and Drafting was quite careful to be as explicit as possible in using the as-
provided-by-law formula. Justice Tate, who was chairman of the Commit-
tee on Style and Drafting, is accurate in pointing out the understanding of
the delegates that:
When used in this context, as it was in 103 other instances in the
1974 constitution, the term "provided by law" means "provided by
legislation." "Law is the solemn expression of legislative will."
Louisiana Civil Code, Art. 1.24
In the absence of other limiting provisions, the formula allows the legisla-
ture to provide by law as it chooses. Indeed, in solving many of the close
19. See State v. Campbell, 324 So. 2d 395 (La. 1975); State v. Bryant, 324 So.
2d 389 (La. 1975).
20. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 16, Dec. 18, at 6-9; id.,
Sept. 14, at 2-6.
21. LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
22. Id. art. V, § 20.
23. Id. art. IV, § 11.
24. Board of Elem. & Sec. Ed. v. Nix, 347 So. 2d 147, 151 (La. 1977).
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questions that arose during the constitutional convention, the outcome was
to establish a rule, but to allow the legislature freedom to change it as it
would in the future, sometimes by majority vote, sometimes by superma-
jorities.25
The supreme court in South Central Bell v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission26 recognized the nature of the as-provided-by-law formula in
applying article IV, section 2(D) which provides that the Public Service
Commission must rule on rate applications within one year of filing and
that failure so to rule allows the increased rate to be put into effect as
provided by law. The court held that the automatic increase procedure was
not established by the constitution and required legislative action. Since
the legislature had enacted no such law, no constitutional requirement
allowing the automatic increase existed. The court was clearly correct in
applying the text exactly as it reads. The lower court in the instant case had
depended on inferences from structure to allow the applicant to implement
the rate increase; however, those inferences are inconsistent with the text
and the history of the text.
The convention was willing to require decisions within a year of the
filing of an application for an increase, but that alone accomplishes little,
for no effective sanction exists. A mandamus suit is slow and costly; a
malfeasance action against commission members is a cumbersome and
unlikely remedy. An early proposal was that "[i]f a decision is not
rendered within six months from the filing date of any proposed rate
schedule, it shall be deemed to be tentatively approved." 27 This self-
executing provision was not adopted and was replaced with the formula
that the increase could be put into effect as provided by law. 28 In consis-
tent convention language, that meant the provision was not self-executing.
Subsequent word changes made the result clearer and the constitution
explicitly says that the "increase may be put into effect, but only if and as
provided by law .... ".29
The legislature also has great leeway in dealing with the powers of
the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE). The
constitution establishes BESE as a corporate body and specifies the com-
position of the board, but it gives the board no powers free of legislative
25. See Hargrave, supra note 4, at 772.
26. 334 So. 2d 189 (La. 1976).
27. Committee Proposal 34, § 14(D)(2) in OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEED-
INGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA,
Dec. 20, 1973, at 9.
28. Id., Dec. 20, at 16 (Roy amendment).
29. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 21(D)(3).
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control. 30 The power to "supervise and control the public elementary and
secondary schools" and the "budgetary responsibility for all funds appro-
priated or allocated by the state for those schools" are qualified by the
explicit language, "all as provided by law. " 31 The language seems as
clear as it could be, especially the use of "all" to indicate that every
power mentioned is so qualified and not just the last of the series. Such
broad legislative power is consistent with the need to order the relationship
between a board composed of both elected and appointed members and an
elected superintendent of education. The only constitutional statement of
supremacy here is that if the superintendent is made an appointive officer,
BESE must make the appointment.32
That BESE is subject to almost total legislative control over its
powers is confirmed by comparison with the language used to enumerate
the powers of the higher education boards. The "as-provided-by-law"
formula is conspicuously absent from sections 5(D), 5(E), 6 and 7 which
grant powers to the Board of Regents and the education management
boards.
BESE v. Nix33 represents supreme court recognition of the legislative
authority over BESE just discussed. The case correctly upholds most of
the provisions of Act 455 of 1976 against an attack that they interfere with
BESE's constitutional powers.
However, the opinion by Justice Tate seems to recognize the exist-
ence of some powers in the board which the legislature cannot take away.
He says:
However, the constitutional provision cannot be interpreted to mean
that the legislature can regulate and limit the constitutional power of
the board to supervise, control, and budget elementary and secondary
education. 34
It is accurate to say the legislature cannot abolish the board or change its
method of composition and selection, for those matters are fixed by
constitutional provision. But the constitution enumerates no powers un-
qualified by the as-provided-by-law formula. Any constitutional powers in
the board would have to be developed by some argument based on
inference and structure and cannot rest on text, for the text only grants
powers that are "all as provided by law."
30. Id. art. VIII, § 3.
31. Id. art. VIII, § 3(A).
32. Id. art. VIII, § 3.
33. 347 So. 2d 147 (La. 1977).
34. Id. at 153.
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Even if one focuses on the provisions of section 2 that the superin-
tendent shall implement the policies of BESE, that still leaves the question
of what policies BESE has the power to establish, a question whose
answer takes us back to section 3 and the fact that the powers there are as
provided by law.
It is no solution to invoke the rule that the legislature cannot deprive a
constitutional agency of the ability to perform its constitutional functions
by withholding the means to perform. This again raises the question of
defining BESE's constitutional function, a question that again, by the text
of section 3, is answered by "all as provided by law."
Admittedly, this approach can result in a constitutional board stripped
of all powers-an impotent formal group with no authority. But that is
what the constitutional convention did in recognizing legislative power
ultimately to decide the difficult political question that the convention
itself did not resolve. 35
35. It was also correct to say that the provisions of article VIII, section I I that
the "legislature shall appropriate funds for the operating and administrative"
expenses of BESE could properly be made to the department of education. This
contrasts with section 12 which requires that appropriations for "institutions of
higher education shall be made to their managing boards." (emphasis added). See
347 So. 2d at 156 n.19.
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